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The symbolism of meat-eating is never neutral. To 
himself, the meat-eater seems to be eating life. To the 
vegetarian, he seems to be eating death. There is a kind 
of gestalt-shift between the two positions which makes 
it hard to change, and hard to raise questions on the 
matter at all without becoming embattled.
Mary Midgley (1983, 27)
In Eat This Book: A Carnivore’s Manifesto, French philoso-
pher Dominique Lestel sets out to demolish the fundamental 
claims of ethical vegetarianism (including veganism) and to 
propose as an alternative what he calls ethical carnivorism. The 
book is translated from the French by prominent animal-rights 
philosopher Gary Steiner. In his preface, Steiner—echoing a 
point made by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty—says, “The best 
way to test one’s own convictions is to open oneself completely 
to the challenge posed by one’s most strenuous critics or oppo-
nents—to confront doubt rather than to seek to extinguish it...” 
(xv). Those interested in seeking truth, says Steiner, will pay 
attention to the challenge posed by this work.
I fully agree with the general sentiment. That said, too much 
of this relatively short book strikes me as less a reasoned chal-
lenge than a veritable “Gish gallop” of assertions, characteriza-
tions, and questions aimed at ethical vegetarianism, tumbling 
over each other with little in the way of analysis or argument. 
Whether it is Lestel’s intention to overwhelm his audience in 
order to avoid having to delve deeper, I cannot say, but an un-
sophisticated reader might be forgiven for thinking the case for 
ethical vegetarianism must be without a logical leg to stand on.
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I have neither the space nor inclination here to look at the 
cornucopia of Lestel’s gallop. (Steiner critiques Lestel, includ-
ing the claim that plants can suffer, in Animals and the Limits 
of Postmodernism, 2013: 218–227.) I am more interested in this 
book insofar as it is an attempt to flesh out what I call “the new 
argument from nature”. Whereas in the past the predominant 
justification for using and consuming animals rested on the as-
sertion of human exceptionalism (A. Taylor 2010)—the claim 
that humans are intrinsically different from and superior to 
animals (typically, because we are rational, moral agents)—in 
recent years the argument has flipped around to justifying hu-
man exploitation of animals on the basis of our similarities and 
connections with the rest of animal creation.
Indeed, Lestel creatively argues that it is vegetarians who 
are driven by a false sense of human exceptionalism. The ethi-
cal vegetarian wrongly imagines that we can transcend the 
natural conditions of existence, which involve the mutual de-
pendence of creatures in a web of predation. “By being willing 
to eat animals, I acknowledge in particular and in an intimate 
manner that there are no ‘free lunches’ in the world—that is, 
that one cannot want to be an animal and at the same time not 
want to be implicated in the cycles of life and death that are 
essential to being an animal. I kill in order to live, just like all 
other animals” (40).
Lestel contends that by rejecting the act of ingesting the 
bodies of other creatures, the vegetarian refuses to recognize 
her dependence on others and rejects her own animality. “The 
central pillar of my argument is that our relationship to animal-
ity cannot be purely conceptual; we must truly live it, meta-
bolically, in our biological and behavioral body and not simply 
simulate it in an analytical fashion” (74). This is not exactly to 
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attempt to justify the status quo: like various other pro-meat 
gurus these days, Lestel opposes the factory farming of ani-
mals as being incompatible with a proper regard for our place 
in the natural world. In his case, what is wanted is not an ethic 
of compassion or of equality but rather an ethic of shared life: 
“I care for the other because the other is the condition for my 
existence and I the condition for the other’s existence” (71).
In the book’s final chapter, Lestel launches into a rather bi-
zarre argument for a new kind of social order: what he calls a 
“constitutional, nonreligious theocracy”. Though not anti-dem-
ocratic, such a society would be guided by shamans in commu-
nication with “disembodied minds”—the nature of these minds 
being unspecified and mysterious, by his own admission. It is 
tempting to think that Lestel has simply gone off the deep end 
here. But a more charitable reading is that he is trying to envi-
sion a modern version of indigenous North American societ-
ies (he refers specifically to the Iroquois nations, and earlier to 
the Algonquin). Unlike industrial societies, these peoples have 
understood themselves to be intimately related in every aspect 
of their being to a sacred, spirit-filled natural world. In Lestel’s 
opinion, it is only by introducing a modern version of such a 
society that the atrocity of the factory farming of animals can 
be abolished—and that limited, reverential consumption of 
meat can become the norm.
Leaving aside Lestel’s many questionable claims (e.g., that 
plants are sentient, that vegetarians have a deep antipathy to-
ward animals, that the ethics of indigenous societies ought to 
be transplanted directly to the very different circumstances of 
modern, non-indigenous societies), there remains a large in-
consistency at the heart of the “circle of life” view. For human 
beings this circle of predation and consumption, of consuming 
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and being consumed, stays unclosed, at least until our indi-
vidual deaths, when it can no longer have significance for us. 
We may imagine that we are immersing ourselves fully in the 
natural world and reclaiming our animality, but unlike other 
animals, humans are never asked to pay a price. We are top 
predators, who have the tools and technology to insulate our-
selves ever more effectively from becoming the prey of others.
Typically, those who advocate reclaiming our animality by 
plunging into the jungle are, rather inconsistently, not willing 
to abandon the protections afforded by civilization. At least 
Holmes Rolston III, an environmental philosopher who de-
fends hunting and meat-eating, recognizes that these activities 
will inevitably involve a form of human exceptionalism. Be-
ing aware of our place in the realm of nature, he says, does 
not mean abandoning the realm of culture. The latter’s rules 
circumscribing behaviour among humans do not apply to our 
actions toward other creatures. The upshot of this is that “The 
boundary between animals and humans has not been rubbed 
out after all; only what was a boundary line has been smeared 
into a boundary zone” (Rolston 1993, 140).
The most that Lestel suggests by way of reciprocity with 
non-humans is that instead of our bodies being cremated when 
we die, they should be buried, to become food for worms. The 
unacknowledged implication is: While we live, we are mon-
archs of the world. That given, the injunction of the “circle of 
life” is that our predation on other species should be carried 
out with reverence for the bounty of nature and with a view to 
ecological sustainability. In other words, we must not despoil 
our kingdom, but our kingdom it remains.
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The philosophy of animal liberation has tended to be na-
ive about the possibility of ending the exploitation of animals 
that is so deeply entrenched in modern societies. Rational ar-
gumentation, whether utilitarian, rights-based, ecofeminist, or 
whatever, can take us only so far. Beyond that is a complex 
struggle over ways of viewing the world that plays out at least 
as much on the basis of emotion, culture, and personal identity 
(C. Taylor 2010). Although Lestel fails to present a logically 
sound case against ethical vegetarianism, that fact is unlikely 
to diminish the lure of the “circle of life” ideology that he ar-
ticulates. Drive a stake into the heart of exploitation justified 
by appeal to human exceptionalism and it morphs into exploi-
tation justified by appeal to ideas of predation and ecological 
balance. The vampire will not die easily.
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